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  1 
“Theories of Justice and International Economic Law”  
 
Frank J. Garcia 
Lindita Ciko 
Boston College Law School 
 
 
I    Introduction 
 
Writing about the relationship between theories of justice and international economic law 
today requires that we begin with three preliminary points. First, by international economic law 
we mean the public international law of economic relations between states and, to an extent, 
between states, individuals and firms, together with the treaty-based institutions (such as the 
WTO, the IMF and the World Bank) created to implement, monitor and adjudicate this body of 
law.  This field is dominated by legal regimes whose aim is trade liberalization, but includes 
international financial law and the international law of economic development also.1  Second, by 
theories of justice we mean that branch of political theory (going back to Aristotle) that concerns 
itself with the allocative fairness of social institutions, i.e. how rights, resources, privileges and 
opportunities are divided among those with a share in the relevant community or enterprise.2   
And, finally, we note the essential and increasingly recognized relationship between the two: 
international economic law and its institutions are powerful engines of resource allocation, 
                                               
1See John Linarelli, Introduction (THIS VOLUME); Steve Charnovitz, What is International Economic Law? 14 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 3-22 (2011); Joel Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 33 (1996); see generally, IGNAZ SEIDLE-HOEHENVELDERN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1999).  For reasons 
of professional familiarity, the authors will primarily draw upon examples from international trade law, but the 
general issues apply, mutatis mutandis, to international economic law more broadly.  See Frank J. Garcia, Justice, 
the Bretton Woods Institutions, and the Problem of Inequality, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL 
SYSTEM, (Chantal Thomas and Joel Trachtman eds. 2009)(hereinafter Garcia, Bretton Woods). 
2 For an overview, see Gillian Brock, Theories of Global Justice, (in this volume); See also SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE 
BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY (2006). 
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between states and within states among various groups, entities, firms and individuals.3  That 
relationship is the subject of this chapter. 
Given the scope of such an inquiry, why its urgency?  There are three reasons why the 
relationship between justice and international economic law has become increasingly important 
(and studied).  First, the stark figures on global poverty, with an undeniable (but contentious) 
connection to economic relations between and within countries, have highlighted the stakes 
involved in this relationship.4   Second, globalization and the global justice debates have brought 
to the fore the key role that international economic law and its institutions play in shaping the 
contours of the global economy and its opportunities, burdens and resources, putting 
international economic law and its institutions at the center of global justice.5   And, third, the 
                                               
3 See generally GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Chios Carmody, Frank J. Garcia & John 
Linarelli, eds. 2011); RICHARD MILLER, GLOBALIZING JUSTICE: THE ETHICS OF POVERTY AND POWER (2010); 
FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE (2003); Aaron James, Distributive Justice without Sovereign 
Rule: The Case of Trade, 31 SOC. THEORY AND PRAC. (2005); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, De-Fragmentation of 
International Economic Law Through Constitutional Interpretation and Adjudication with Due Respect for 
Reasonable Disagreement, 1 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L ECON. L. REV., 209-247 (2004); Joost Pauwelyn, Frank J. Garcia, 
Christian Barry and Susan Esserman, Just Trade Under Law: Do We Need a Theory of Justice for International 
Trade Relations? 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 100,  375 (2006). 
4 To take just one example, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, there were 925 million 
undernourished people in the world in 2010, 88% of whom were in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia and the Pacific; 
and, as many scholars and organizations have pointed out, the quantity and distribution of food supplies is much 
more a matter of human agency and regulation than it is of natural conditions.  Food and Agriculture Organization, 
The State of Food Insecurity in the World (2010); see ROBERT BAILEY, OXFAM, GROWING A BETTER FUTURE: FOOD 
JUSTICE IN A RESOURCE CONSTRAINED WORLD, (2011) available at 
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/cr-growing-better-future-170611-en.pdf; AMARTY SEN, 
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (2000); Thomas Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation, in FREEDOM 
FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT, 11-54 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2008); see also Chantal Thomas, Poverty Reduction, 
Trade and Rights, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1399 (2003); Joel Trachtman, Trade Law and Global Apartheid, 6 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 3 (2003). The precise nature of the connection between poverty and transnational economic relations 
is of course a highly contentious question.  While scholars debate the nature of this connection, all agree (or better, 
none disagree) on the existence and importance of the connection.  See e.g. Thomas Pogge, Moral Universalism and 
Global Economic Justice, 1 POL. PHIL. ECON. 29-58 (2002); Fernando Tesón and Jonathan Klick, Global Justice and 
Trade in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Chi Carmody, Frank J. Garcia & John Linarelli, 
eds., Cambridge), (forthcoming) (hereinafter Tesón and Klick, Global Justice). 
5See, e.g., GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Chi Carmody, Frank J. Garcia & John Linarelli, 
eds., 2011); DAVID KINLEY, CIVILISING GLOBALIZATION (2009); RICHARD MILLER supra note 3. Anthony Anghie, 
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growth and proliferation of such institutions and their increasing agency have brought them into 
greater and much-needed scrutiny as a form of transnational governance, with respect to their 
normative underpinnings, legitimacy and allocative effects.6 
In view of all this, what can theories of justice bring to international economic law and its 
institutions?  First, theories of justice can help us determine the proper objective of international 
economic law and policy.  To a large extent, of course, both domestic and international politics 
and national self-interest influence the objectives of specific treaties and institutions.  But the 
social analysis of the ends and means of international economic law cannot end with an 
empirical study of the power and interests which shape it – we must also determine as best we 
can the proper aims for international economic law according to our understanding of what is 
helpful, fair and just (and therefore legitimate)7, as with any other area of law, policy and the 
public exercise of political power.  And even diplomats, trade negotiators and bureaucrats are 
influenced by concerns over justice, fairness and progressive social outcomes, within the limits 
of their institutional mandate and the politics they work with.8    
                                                                                                                                                       
Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the Third World, 32  N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L & POL (1999-2000); Frank J. Garcia, Globalization and the Theory of International Law, 11 INT’L THEORY 9 
(2005); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and “Constitutional Justice, 19  EUR. 
J. INT’L LAW 769 (2008); Mathias Risse, How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor? 33 PHIL. & AND PUB. AFF. 349 
(2005).  
6Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFFAIRS 405 (2006); Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or 
Global Subsidiarity? 16 GOVERNANCE 73 (2003); Patricia Nanz, Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutionalisation 
of Transnational Trade Governance: A View from Political Theory, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILATERAL TRADE 
GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL REGULATION (Christian Joerges & E-U Petersmann eds., 2006).  
7 There is a necessary relationship between the legitimacy of transnational state action and its consistency with core 
political values such as justice, about which more will be said below.  See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING 
INTERNATIONAL ACTS (1989) (international acts require ‘vertical legitimacy’ or consistency with core constitutive 
political values); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4-5  (Belknap Press: 1999)(1971) (hereinafter RAWLS, 
THEORY OF JUSTICE). 
8 See Jeffrey L. Dunnoff, Rethinking International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 347 (1998); James Bacchus, A 
Few Thoughts on Legitimacy, Democracy, and the WTO, 7 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 667 (2004); Robert Howse, From 
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Second, theories of justice can help us evaluate whether or not international economic 
law as a whole, and specific treaties, rules and institutions, are “fair” or “unfair” according to our 
various competing understandings of such principles.  Amartya Sen has recently written 
persuasively about the two major differing approaches to such an inquiry: the “transcendental 
institutionalism” approach in which we seek a single comprehensive view of fairness; and the 
‘realization-focused comparison’ approach in which multiple competing views of fairness (and 
unfairness) help us reach a decision to act against grave injustice according to a variety of 
reasons.9  More will be said about this below, but the essential point is that we need a rich 
multitude of critical views on fairness and unfairness in global economic relations if we are to 
persuasively and effectively address social injustice.  And, as with any system of social 
allocation, we can’t afford to ignore questions of fairness and social injustice in international 
economic law, if for no other reason than that the risk of perceived unfairness and its social 
consequences is too serious.10 
 Third, theories of justice can help us evaluate whether international economic law 
institutions are legitimate. Legitimacy is implicated in and, in a sense, already underlies any 
discussion of justice, although the two concepts are distinct. Rawls calls justice the  “first virtue 
                                                                                                                                                       
Politics to Technocracy – And Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime 96 A.J.I.L 94 (2002); but 
see Thomas Pogge, Priorities of Global Justice, 32 METAPHILOSOPHY 6-24 (2001)(characterizing the persistent 
failure to effectively address remediable global poverty as principally a political failure).  Raj Bhala makes an 
interesting point about this with respect to the Doha Round.  Insofar as the Round was initiated in part to address the 
poverty that contributed to terrorism in Islamic countries, negotiators were motivated to ameliorate, if not eradicate, 
such poverty through trade.  However, as time passed, that motivation was abandoned and current negotiators have 
become less concerned with the initial aim, adopting a narrower (and more traditional) agenda of advancing 
domestic interests.  Poverty, Islamist Extremism, and the Debacle of Doha Round Counter-Terrorism; Part One of a 
Trilogy – Agricultural Tariffs and Subsidies, 9 U. St. Thomas L. J. – (2011)(forthcoming). 
9AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 24-27 (2009). 
10Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Justice and Security, in TRADE AS GUARANTOR OF PEACE LIBERTY & SECURITY? (PADIDEH 
ALA’I ET AL. EDS., 2006). 
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of social institutions”11 because one of the problems in a democratic society is the imposition of 
the will of the majority, upon a minority.12 Thus the only way to minimize that friction is to 
construct institutions that are just. As international institutions expand, they compete with 
national institutions for legitimacy, and thus justice becomes an important metric in how 
legitimate these international institutions are. Although an institution could conceivably be 
legitimate even when its aim is not the pursuit of global justice, this claim is less and less true at 
a time in which global public reason demands that international institutions pursue global justice 
at least to a certain degree.13 
   There are several ways through which the legitimacy of international institutions can be 
assessed. The most common way is to look to formal measures of legitimacy such as treaty 
ratification, or to institutional consistency with broad political values such as democratic 
participation. Another way to look at the problem of legitimacy that explicitly connects it to the 
                                               
11RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 3. 
12 Id., at 319. 
13 Even a critic such as Thomas Nagel writes of the minimal yet discernible (and meaningful) trajectory of justice in 
existing international institutions.  Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113, 146-7 
(2005). See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law, (in this volume) 
(manuscript at 12, on file with authors)  (discussing constitutional and justice aspects of public reason with respect 
to international economic law).  Joshua Cohen and Michael Sabel argue that global public reason play an important 
role in evaluating the legitimacy of international institutions and has seriously impacted the policies and behavior of 
international institutions. In contemporary global societal and informational infrastructure, international institutions 
can feel as close to private individuals as domestic institutions creating similar expectations of justice and legitimacy 
from such institutions in the same way as they do towards domestic institutions.  Cohen and Sabel write: 
 
“A transnational politics of movements and organizations—beyond the intergovernmental politics 
between states—now routinely contests and aims to reshape the activities of supranational 
rulemaking bodies. Those efforts work in part through protest, in part by representing interests to 
those bodies, and in part by advancing norms, values, and standards of reasonableness—that is, by 
suggesting potential elements of a global public reason that might serve as a common ground of 
argument in assessing the practices and performances in global politics.”  
 
Joshua Cohen and Michael Sabel, Global Democracy? 37 NYU J. L. & Pol., 763-797 (2005); for an analysis of 
global public reason see generally Sebastiano Maffetone, The Fragile Fabric of Public Reason, in The Dialogue: 
Reason and Reasonabless [sic] (Yearbook of Philosophical Hermeneutics), 407-440 (Ricardo Dottori ed., 2005).  
  6 
conversation on justice, is by looking at the goals of these institutions (whether in their charter or 
ones they have come to assume gradually – both kinds can be found in the WTO) and assess to 
what degree these institutions are delivering outcomes consistent with these objectives.  In this 
chapter we look at legitimacy from the point of view of what Aaron James has called “internal” 
approaches to justice, in which one looks either at the mandate and formal structure of an 
organization as well as its members’ expectations, or at core constitutive elements of the 
underlying social interaction (here the role of consent in trade as a human experience), and then 
evaluates the performance of the organization against those “internal” elements.   
    Theories of justice can also suggest alternative models and specific reforms to make 
international economic law more fair (and therefore more legitimate), if we decide that it is not 
particularly fair in whole or in part – our fourth point.14  It is part of the mandate of international 
institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF that they pursue goals of global 
justice. Such institutions are controversial in part because of the idea (properly conceived or 
misconceived) that they are not doing enough in this respect, or that taken as a whole they are 
responsible for the stark imbalances in global wealth distribution.15 What theories of justice can 
offer in this discussion is a fundamental understanding of the role of justice in international 
economic institutions, which coupled with a close understanding of the operational structure of 
these institutions can help us formulate both new policy options and benchmarks or metrics for 
evaluating progress towards a more just arrangement.16 
Finally, and in an overall sense independent of the substantive merit of particular views 
or institutions, theories of justice offer international economic law actors, students and critics a 
                                               
14 An excellent recent example is GILLIAN BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note 2. 
15 See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 18- 22 (2003); Douglas Arner, Lending 
And...: Conditionality (in this volume). 
16 See “Conclusion,” GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW supra note 5. 
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powerful normative language through which to articulate their goals for international economic 
law and policy, and their critiques of the system’s existing mission, structure, operation and 
effects.  Much as when in interpersonal communication we reach for the language of poetry and 
ritual to express the significance of a moment, in law we reach for the language of justice to 
express our deepest aspirations and disappointments with respect to the law itself. 
This chapter aims to review the issues and opportunities that arise in the application of 
theories of justice to international economic law and its institutions, particularly within the 
context of the global justice debate.  We will survey the basic avenues of approach to the subject, 
the technical and policy issues which arise in the undertaking, specific key topics of interest in 
this area such as the trade linkage phenomenon and its relationship to justice, and the major 
obstacles which must be addressed if one is to carry out a sustained normative critique of 
international economic law and its institutions.    
 
II    Justice and International Economic Law 
 The question of justice and international economic law is at heart nothing more (or less) 
than the question of fairness: are the rules, institutions and outcomes in transnational economic 
relations “fair” or “unfair?” However, it is deceptively simple to ask such a question, because the 
answers lead us into some of the most complicated and contentious issues of economic and 
political theory today. 
 Some of the topics and issues that come up when one seeks to answer this seemingly 
simple question are:  
  8 
 What is the proper objective of international economic law?17 Efficiency?18 
Fairness?19 Equality?20 And how is that aim achieved?21 Deregulation?22 An 
equal basic package?23 Context-adjusted equality of opportunity?24 
Constitutionalism?25 
  What is the metric? How do we know we get there? Growth?26 
Development?27 Poverty alleviation?28 Aggregate wealth increases?29 
                                               
17 See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Future of International Economic Law: A Research Agenda, EUI 
Working Paper LAW 2010/6, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698592. See also THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (William J. Davey and John H. Jackson eds., 2008); THE POLITICS OD 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Tomer Broude, Marc L. Busch and Amelia Porges eds., 2011). 
18 See e.g. Andrea Maneschi, International Trade Theory and Comparative Advantage (in this volume); Tesón and 
Klick, Global Justice; Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, Trade and Investment, in THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 335- 66 (Rutledge, 2nd ed. 1999); JAGDISH BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY (2002) 
19 See AMERICO ZAMPETTI, FAIRNESS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2006); THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1998); Brian Barry, International Society from a Cosmopolitan 
Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin, eds, 1998); John Linarelli, Principles 
of Fairness for International Economic Treaties: Constructivism and Contractualism (2006); Barbara Stark, 
Distributive Justice and the Limits of Economic Law, 30 B. C. THIRD WORLD L. J.  1 (2010). 
20See generally, FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE 
(2003) (hereinafter, GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE); RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE; Richard J. Arneson, 
Equality, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 593-611,  (Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit, 
and Thomas Pogge eds. 2007); Gillian Moon, Trade and Equality: A Relationship to Discover, 12 J INT’L ECON. L. 
617 (2009). 
21See e.g., Gillian Brock, Taxation and Global Justice: Closing the Gap between Theory and Practice, 39 J. SOC. 
161–84 (2008). On the distributive role of international institutions see e.g. CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979) (hereinafter BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY); Wilfried Hinsch, Global 
Distributive Justice, 32 METAPHILOSOPHY, 58–78 (2001). 
22 Tesón and Klick, Global Justice. 
23 See Frank J. Garcia, The ‘Fair’ Trade Law of Nations, or a ‘Fair’ Global Law of Economic Relations? 45 
ALBERTA L. REV. 303 (2007); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Trade: Defining and 
Connecting the Two Fields, in  HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Thomas Cottier, et. al, eds., 2005). 
24 See Daniel Butt, Global Equality of Opportunity as an Institutional Standard of Distributive Justice, in GLOBAL 
JUSTICE ,supra note 16. 
25See. e.g., ENST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF 
INTENRATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1991); Ruth Buchanan, Legitimating Global Trade Governance: Constitutional 
And Legal Pluralist Approaches 57 N. I. LEGAL Q. 654-672 (2006); Vlad Perju, Cosmopolitanism and Constitutional 
Self-Government, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 326 (2010).    
26 See Stark, supra note 17. See also Ravi Arvind Palat, A New Bandun? Economic Growth vs. Distributive Justice 
Among Emerging Powers, 40 FUTURES, 721-734 (2008). 
27 See e.g., AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY RE-EXAMINED, (1992) 
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 What role should human rights play in achieving economic fairness?30 
 What normative conclusions can we reach about international institutions current or 
future, and how would those conclusions impact their effectiveness and legitimacy?31 
 What do we do at the international level about distributive problems within states – 
and the attendant problems of intervention, intrusiveness, kleptocratic regimes and 
inadequate domestic institutions.32 What is the proper role of domestic institutions 
versus global ones in alleviating poverty and inequality.33 
 How is the relevant community of justice constituted where global economic 
relations and global economic institutions are concerned?34 Is it everyone 
(cosmopolitanism or human rights)35, the nation state (communitarianism)36, treaty 
                                                                                                                                                       
28 See e.g., JEAN DRÈZE AND  AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBLIC ACTION (1989); Onora O'Neill, Lifeboat Earth, 
in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, ( Charles R. Beitz, ed., 1985). 
29 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS  (Penguin, 1999) (1776); Teson and Klick, Global Justice. 
30 See e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law (in this volume); SARAH 
JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO? A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE (2010); HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY IN RIGHTS (1994); 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional Justice, 19 EJIL (2008). 
31 See e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Economic Law, “Public Reason”, and Multilevel Governance of 
Interdependent Public Good, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 23-76 (2011); Ruth Buchanan supra note 25; Robert Howse & 
Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity? 16 GOVERNANCE 
73-94 (2003) 
32 See e.g., John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES WITH THE IDEA OF  PUBIC REASON REVISITED 
(4th ed., 1999). See also, ETHICS AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION, (Deen Chatterjee and Don Scheid, eds.,  2003); 
Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF., 257-296, (2001).  
33RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE. See e.g. Blake supra note 32.  
34 See e.g., J. Mandle, J., Distributive Justice at Home and Abroad, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY, (Thomas Christiano and John Christman, eds., 2009); Howard F. Chang, The Economics of 
International Labor Migration and the Case for Global Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory, 41 
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1-26, (2008). 
35See e.g., CANEY supra note 2. Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, in THE RIGHTS OF 
MINORITY CULTURES, 331-349 (Will Kymlicka, ed., 1995). 
36 See e.g.,DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2007); but see Brian Barry, Statism 
and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, 12-66 (Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer, eds., 1999); 
KOK-CHOR TAN, JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM, AND PATRIOTISM (2004). 
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parties (positivism),37 participants in a cooperative scheme for social benefits 
(contractarians38), all affected individuals (utilitarianism39)? 
As a starting point, it is useful to divide approaches to these questions into two basic 
groups: the “external” approach and the “internal” approach.  As will be seen, each plays a vital 
role in our attempts to answer the questions, and each has its own methodologies, strengths and 
limitations.  
 A    External versus Internal Approaches to Justice and International Economic Law 
 The essential characteristic of all external approaches (and most current approaches are 
external) is that they take a particular normative theory and apply it to a body of law.40  They are 
“external” because the theory underlying the analysis is not “legal” in a positive sense, but comes 
from moral theory, political theory, or some other branch of social theory that concerns itself 
with fairness.41 Put this way, there is nothing exotic or unique about the external approach – it is 
what we do all the time, every day, when we critique law and its effects.   
However, the external critique of international economic law is somewhat less developed 
than for most domestic law, for a variety of reasons.  First, most political theory is developed in a 
domestic context, which means it must be adapted to an international social context.  Moreover, 
this adaptation/extension must be justified – the fact that the relevant social and economic 
relations occur across national boundaries raises specific issues with respect to arguing for 
                                               
37 See Terry Nardin, Legal Positivism as a Theory of International Society, in INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 17-35 
(DAVID R. MAPEL AND TERRY NARDIN EDS. 1998). 
38 John Linarelli, What Do We Owe Each Other in the Global Economic Order: Constructivist and Contractualist 
Accounts, 15 J.  TRANSNAT’L & POL’Y 181 (2005-2006),  
39 Robert E. Goodin, Globalizing Justice, in RESHAPING GLOBALIZATION: A PROGRESSIVE APPROACH, (David Held 
and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2003) 
40 See, e.g., Gillian Brock’s contribution to this volume. 
41 A wide range of social theory concerns itself with justice and is therefore relevant to the inquiry.  See KARL R. 
SCHERER, JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (1992). 
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transboundary moral obligations, which we inevitably must do with an external critique of a 
transnational system of law such as international economic  law.  Finally, for many years the 
normative critique of the field was dominated by economic theory, which from the perspective of 
this taxonomy is really just another external theory.  However, economists and mainstream trade 
scholars tended to obscure this fact (willfully nor not) and operate as if economic theory held a 
privileged place in the analysis of international law independently of these issues.42 
 In contrast, internal approaches to the question of international economic law and justice 
begin with a radically different starting point: within the system or phenomenon of economic 
relations and their regulatory structure, and not outside of them.43  For example, internal 
approaches to trade and justice (and we discuss two here – James’ structural equity approach and 
an approach based on consent) begin with trade as an experience or trade law as a system, and 
seek to articulate those principles inherent in each, which must be respected if trade is to be 
trade, and if trade law is to function optimally to achieve its social purpose.  
 Both of these approaches – the external and internal – have unique methodological 
approaches and will illuminate distinct aspects of both international economic law in general and 
our specific question of the fairness of the trade law system.  We will now discuss in turn both 
approaches with respect to trade law, illustrating them as we proceed with examples of how each 
approach works. 
     B.    Engaging International Trade Law through Political Theory 
                                               
42GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE, 14-19.  
43 The relevant comparison here is to Fuller’s epochal book THE MORALITY OF LAW, in which he sought to develop 
an alternative approach to the question of law’s morality distinct from the dominant natural law theories which were 
clearly external in the sense discussed here. Fuller asked of law in general the same question which internal 
approaches seek to ask about trade law: what are the principles inherent in the system which must be respected if the 
system is to operate as a system of law, and fulfill its ordained social purpose?  These principles are the “internal” 
morality of law. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). 
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    In order to develop an external normative critique of trade law, one must first offer a 
general account of the relationship between trade law and political theory.  At first glance, it 
should seem obvious that trade law raises normative issues and should itself be subject to 
normative critique by political and moral philosophy.  However, it is not in fact so obvious, at 
least it has not been in contemporary mainstream Anglo-American trade scholarship.44 
Moreover, the fact that we are dealing in transnational normative obligations gives rise to unique 
challenges.  Therefore, the first step is to develop a general account of the relationship between 
trade law and political theory that accounts for the possibility of normative claims within 
international economic law. 
  1. Engaging Trade and Justice Generally  
 There is a range of possible avenues through which to establish a basis for normative 
obligations within international trade law.  One approach to the relationship is Lea Brilmayer’s 
“vertical thesis,” which treats this as a question of the legitimacy of state action.  For Brilmayer, 
“governmental coercion that extends across international borders is governmental coercion 
nonetheless,”45 and must be justified by reference to some form of political theory, or it will lack 
legitimacy.  Thus, the authority for transboundary state action is ultimately derived from its 
justification in traditional political morality.46 Such justification is “vertical,” in that it is drawn 
“upwards” from the political norms regulating the underlying relationship between the individual 
and the relevant political institution, rather than “horizontally” according to a notion of ethics 
between co-equal state actors.47 Brilmayer’s theory is thus a powerful argument for the moral 
                                               
44 See Joost Pauwelyn, Book Review: Just Trade, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 101-114 (2005) (current scholarly 
orthodoxy eschews any normative analysis of international economic law).  
45
 BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at 11.  
46 Id. at 16-17. 
47 Id. at 2. 
  13 
coherence of state action: the legitimacy of all state acts, both domestic and international, derives 
from the state’s observance of the same set of core political principles.   
Another way to ground an external critique of the fairness of trade law is to base the 
relationship between political theory and trade law on the functional characteristics of trade law 
as a social institution.  The primary impetus towards justice, according to Rawls, is the fact that 
social cooperation gives rise to certain benefits and burdens, which need to be allocated.  For that 
cooperative social scheme to be just, those benefits and burdens should be allocated according to 
some relevant idea of what is ‘right.’48 In Beitz’ words, “the requirements of justice apply to 
institutions and practices (whether or not they are genuinely cooperative) in which social activity 
produces relative or absolute benefits or burdens that would not exist if the social activity did not 
take place.”49  
International economic relations satisfy this condition, because they lead to increases in 
individual and national wealth through the operation of comparative advantage and principles of 
efficiency in general.  It is through international trade law that the terms of such cooperation are 
established.  Justice is therefore relevant to the operation of the social institutions that effectuate 
the international allocation of the benefits and burdens of international economic cooperation, 
principally international trade law and the WTO. 
                                               
48  RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 4-5.  Rawls himself did not extend his theory of Justice as Fairness across national 
boundaries, although many of his followers have.  See GARCIA, TRADE INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE, supra note 20 at 
119-146; see also infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
49 CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY 131.  Barry objects to the extension of justice as fairness obligations to 
international society on the basis of such economic relations, questioning whether such relations are in fact 
sufficiently reciprocal and dependent.  See Brian Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective, in NOMOS 
XXIV 219, 232-34 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982).  As Beitz has since clarified, however, he 
is not arguing for the necessity of such obligations on the grounds of such relations, but merely for their relevance.  
See Charles Beitz, Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment, 80 J. PHIL. 591 (1983).  
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 Additional alternative approaches to the relationship between trade law and normative 
political theory could include a cosmopolitan or capabilities approach emphasizing trade law’s 
impact on individuals’ life prospects,50 or a human rights approach emphasizing trade law’s 
impact on fundamental rights.51 Naturally, political theories will articulate this relationship in the 
distinct terms relevant to that theory.52 All of these alternatives perform the same conceptual 
function, namely to articulate the relationship between trade law and normative theory as a 
general matter, before proceeding to apply a particular theory to trade law.   
2 Level of Obligation: Duties between States versus Duties between 
Individuals  
 
 A second preliminary issue involves determining at which level to locate the claims and 
duties of justice: the state or the individual.53  In other words, does international justice create 
claims on individuals, or on states?  
 Traditionally, international law has followed the society of states model, in which the 
level of analysis is the state, instead of the individual.  Thus moral duties, if they exist at the 
international level, exist between states as moral actors.  While more consistent with orthodox 
                                               
50 See e.g. CANEY, supra note 2, at 102-47. See also Priscilla Schwartz, Development in World Trade Law, J. INT’L. 
COM. & TECH. 50-60, (2009) The most prominent theory on the relation of international economics and human 
development is the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen with Martha Nussbaum and others. For an 
overview of the capabilities approach see generally Ingrid Robeyns, The Capbility Approach: A Theoretical Survey, 
6 J. HUM. DEV. 93-117 (2005).    
51 See e.g., Carol C. Gould, Approaching Global Justice Through Human Rights: Elements of Theory and Practice, 
in GLOBAL JUSTICE supra note 5; SARAH JOSEPH, supra note 30; Gillian Moon, The WTO-Minus Strategy: 
Development and Human Rights under WTO Law, 2 HUM. RTS. & INT’L. LEGAL DISCOURSE, UNSW Law Research 
Paper No. 2008-10, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1392057 (2008). 
52 Utilitarian or libertarian approaches would, for example, focus on the utility effects of trade rules or their impact 
on individual liberty and property rights.  See GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE 43-53. 
53 See generally Gillian Brock, supra note 39. supra note 5 (sections 3-5, manuscript on file with authors)  
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international legal theory, this approach is no longer adequate given the post-war human rights 
revolution, and leads to the sorts of problems raised by critics such as Beitz.54     
 The leading contemporary alternative is cosmopolitanism, which locates all international 
moral obligations at the level of the individual.55  However, cosmopolitanism depends upon a 
view of international society as composed of persons, not states, which strikes many as 
empirically unjustifiable, given the many deep political and social divisions among the world’s 
people.56 
One can also attempt to follow something of a compromise approach, in which the role of 
justice in international economic relations is a function of our individual moral commitments, 
carried out in the international arena through the state as our moral agent. Where individuals 
cannot effectively act to address moral questions, the moral obligations create a case for moral 
agency at the collective level: the state.57 The obligation to do justice applies to the government 
of State X as the agent of its citizens, stemming from the moral obligations of its citizens, the 
nature of justice, and the functions and powers of the state. The moral responsibility remains 
ultimately our own, even if the acts are taken at the collective agency level.58    
                                               
54 The state-moral person equation leads among other things to some of the abuses associated with an absolute 
sovereignty doctrine.  See CHARLES BEITZ supra note 38, 71-83; see also FERNANDO TESÓN, A PHILOSOPHY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-41 (1998). 
55 CANEY, supra note 2. 
56 This is the standard communitarian objection to the possibility of global justice.  However, it can be argued that 
globalization is changing the nature of global social relations such that the cosmopolitan view of global social 
relations is increasingly tenable; indeed, in some areas and to some degree, global social relations may even meet 
more stringent communitarian requirements for justice.  See Frank J. Garcia, Globalization and the Theory of 
International Law, 11 INT’L LEG. THEORY 9, 12-21 (2005).  
57 See e.g. ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 28-44 (1995) (discussing the state’s 
responsibility to act as our moral agent, in particular where individual action is barred or inadequate).  
58 Id. at 34-35.  Pogge characterizes this as a second-order responsibility, insofar as the principles of justice apply to 
institutions and not directly to the conduct of persons.  Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 
ETHICS 48, 50 (1992).  Nevertheless, he acknowledges that we still retain responsibility, albeit indirect, for the 
justice of institutional practices we participate in.  Id. 
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  3     The Problem of Transboundary Moral Obligation 
 Our aim in the preceding section was to illustrate approaches to the overall relationship 
between justice as a general matter and international trade law. Now, we turn to a broad category 
of objections raised against the affirmative relationship between trade and justice, again on a 
general level, namely objections to the possibility or coherence of transboundary justice at all.59    
 a. Territorial Boundaries and Moral Obligations 
 The objection that territorial boundaries circumscribe moral obligations may simply 
express an initial assumption that moral ties must involve relationships “closer to home” than in 
international society at large.60 On more substantive grounds, one might question the possibility 
of transboundary moral obligations on the basis of the nature of moral obligation itself.  
Proponents of this view may, for example, object on communitarian grounds, rooting justice in 
communal relations of sufficient depth as to preclude such obligations across national 
boundaries. 61  More ominously, such objections might instead merely mask baser motives such 
as bigotry, selfishness or insensitivity to others.62     
                                               
59 See generally Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas, Introduction, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
13-19 (BESSON & TASIOULAS EDS. 2010)(surveying traditional objections to the possibility of a robust normative 
critique of international law); GARCIA, TRADE INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE, supra note – at 86-96 (on which the present 
survey is based).  We do not discuss the broader but related objection to international law’s status as law at all.  See 
Id. at 96-102; Besson and Tasioulas 6-13. 
60 This reaction has deep roots in the Western tradition.  See Jon Mandle, Globalization and Justice, 570 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.  SCI. 129-30, (2000). (“outsiders” were often denied moral standing in early European 
political thought). 
61  See, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 53 (1982); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF 
JUSTICE supra note 13.  As will be discussed below, the social basis of this objection is, however, changing through 
globalization, such that meta-national obligations of justice may be justifiable even on communitarian grounds.  See 
Frank J. Garcia, Globalization and the Theory of International Law, 11 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 9 (2005). 
62 See Samuel Gorovitz, Bigotry, Loyalty and Malnutrition, in FOOD POLICY 129 (Brown & Shue, eds. 1977). 
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 Under both deontological and consequential approaches to justice, territorial boundaries 
need not preclude the possibility of transnational moral obligations – quite the opposite.63  Under 
the deontological approach, the obligation to do justice is founded on a duty one owes to all 
persons by virtue of their status as human beings64.  There is no room in this theory for 
limitations based on the contingent circumstances of national boundaries.65 If one has such a 
duty, one has it absolutely to all persons everywhere.66 Therefore, national boundaries may affect 
our choice of instrumentalities and our overall effectiveness, but they do not affect the nature of 
the obligation itself. 
 In a consequentialist approach such as utilitarianism, the fact that one finds oneself 
separated by a boundary from the object of one’s moral inquiry may affect one’s utility calculus 
in a material way.  The difficulties associated with determining the utility effects of a given act 
or practice are well-known, and interposition of a national boundary may well make that more 
difficult.67 It may also be even more impractical or expensive to maximize the utility of persons 
                                               
63 Deontological ethics focus on the nature of acts regardless of the effects of such acts. What is important here is 
that the act conforms with some moral maxim or norm (e.g. Kant’s categorical imperative). An alternative approach 
is consequentialism, in which approach territorial boundaries could be considered important because one’s 
surroundings and circumstances bear on how we morally evaluate an act.  GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND 
JUSTICE at 77-82. 
64 See, e.g., GILLIAN BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE supra note 2. 
65 This is most prominently represented by the cosmopolitan strand of justice theory, and has been reflected in the 
work of prominent international legal theorists for some time.  See Gillian Brock, Theories of Global Justice: A 
Survey (in this volume); see generally Anthony D’Amato & Kristen Engel, State Responsibility for the Exportation 
of Nuclear Power Technology, 74 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1042 (1988) (stating that “a national boundary is an artificial, 
as well as a morally irrelevant, boundary with respect to moral obligations”); Fernando R. Tesón, The Kantian 
Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 82-83 (1992) (stating that “[t]he contingent division of the 
world into discrete nation-states does not transform political freedom from an ethical imperative into a mere 
accident of history”). 
66 See Will Kymlicka, Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective, in BOUNDARIES AND JUSTICE 337 
(Miller and Hashmi eds. 2001) (one cannot justify borders whose effect is to privilege some groups at the expense of 
others); see also ONORA O’NEILL, BOUNDS OF JUSTICE (2000).  For opposing views, see WILLIAM AIKEN & HUGH 
LA FOLLETE, WORLD HUNGER AND MORALITY (1995). 
67 See, e.g., Russel Hardin, Efficiency, in COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 12, at 
463-69 (surveying difficulty with interpersonal comparisons of utility, among other difficulties). 
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across national boundaries, especially if there are corresponding utility costs to others closer to 
home.68   
 These contingent reasons, however, should not be confused with any necessary formal 
barrier to the inclusion of the preferences or interests of people across boundaries into such 
utility calculations.  Even if introducing the preferences of foreigners make utility calculations 
more difficult, it does not alter them in kind. On the grounds of such objections, one might 
decide against espousing utilitarianism, but one could not on this basis justify utilitarianism at 
home and something else abroad. 
b. Justice as a Function of Specific Social Relationships 
 
 Contractarians and communitarians assume that justice is not a general obligation for all 
people, but is limited to persons in particular types of relationships.69 In response to 
contractarians, it has been argued that such objections are in fact an artifact of social 
contractarian arguments for political morality, rather than a general limitation inherent to moral 
obligations by their very nature.70  The response to communitarians is more complex, as their 
objection goes to the nature of justice itself. 
                                               
68 On the debate surrounding Peter Singer’s famous (and famously demanding) utilitarian account of global justice 
in “Famine Affluence and Morality,” see Brock, supra note – at – (page 4 of her chapter in MS); see generally Tan, 
Justice Without Borders 41-43 (discussing the historical limits of utilitarian approaches and its evolving role in the 
global justice debate through institutional utilitarianism). 
69 Theorists as disparate as Rawls and Walzer find common ground in this objection to transnational justice, much to 
the chagrin of an army of Rawlsians. See, e.g., Leif Wenar, Contractualism and Global Economic Justice, 32 
Metaphilosophy 79 (2001) (critically reviewing Rawlsian and Scanlonian contractualism and their anemic responses 
to global injustice, and suggesting alternative approaches); but see John Linarelli, What Do We Owe Each Other in 
the Global Economic Order? Constructivist and Contractualist Accounts, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y. 181 
(2006)(suggesting a stronger Scanlonian contractualist account of global justice obligation).  On the communitarian 
objection, see MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD (2006).   
70 Kymlicka, supra note 55.  For this reason I disagree with Caney (supra note 2 at 105-106) that Rawlsian accounts 
of global justice represent an “institutionalist” cosmopolitan approach, since transnational obligations on this view 
depend upon contingent circumstances rather than universal obligations.   
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 At an intuitive level, there is a certain plausibility to the assertion that for justice to be 
possible, there has to be a minimum level of the sort of institutional community Aristotle referred 
to as “having a share in the constitution.”71 Accepting for the moment Aristotle’s contention that 
the applicability of justice is limited to conditions in which social goods are allocated in a 
context of mutual political and legal relationships, the relevant question is whether international 
society is such a community. The dramatic evolution of the treaty-based international economic 
system and the social and economic interconnectedness characteristic of globalization suggest 
that we may be seeing at least elements of a transnational community of justice emerging at least 
within certain spheres, such as among the parties to significant global socio-economic treaties.72 
One could argue, then, that for participants in this regulated global economic order, international 
economic relations in the contemporary global system satisfy the minimum contractarian or 
communitarian requisites for a consideration of the claims of justice, namely that allocation of 
the social goods created by the treaties in question (rights, privileges, advantages and 
obligations) proceeds according to shared understandings of economic justice informed by the 
treaties themselves. 
  c. International Order or State of Nature? Hobbes and Transboundary Justice 
 Perhaps the most persistent argument against the possibility of transboundary moral 
obligations is an essentially Hobbesian one: international society is best characterized as a state 
of nature, in which states independently and aggressively pursue their own interests.73 There is 
                                               
71 ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, 402, bk. V, ch. 2. 
72 See, e.g., Andrew Hurrell, Global Inequality and International Institutions, 2 METAPHILOSOPHY 34-57 (2001); 
Frank J. Garcia, Globalization, Global Community and the Possibility of Global Justice, B.C. L. SCH. FAC. PAPERS, 
Paper 33 (2005). 
73See BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY at  4. In the words of one proponent of this view, Stanley Hoffman, devising 
principles of justice: “is practically meaningless in the international milieu, because…in a milieu where self-help is 
the rule and where force can always be used by each agent, there is no guarantee whatsoever that these principles 
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no political authority powerful enough to ensure the security of the actors concerned, nor to 
guarantee them the means to a satisfying life.  Cooperation, if it occurs, is ad hoc and unstable, 
and competition is the order of the day.   
In this view, domestic notions of moral obligation have no place in the war “of every 
man, against every man.”74 Under such circumstances as states find themselves in the 
international arena, it would be irrational to submit oneself to moral obligations in the absence of 
a government with the power to reward compliance and punish noncompliance.75 Consequently, 
under such conditions “nothing can be unjust.  The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and 
Injustice, have no place.  Where there is no common power, there is no Law; where no Law, no 
Injustice.”76 
 Whatever its accuracy in the 17th century, the Hobbesian account of international 
relations is empirically untenable today.77 As has been well documented by regime theorists and 
other critics of international realism, global cooperation, interdependence, and law-based 
compliance are the new facts of the international arena.78 While law-breaking continues to be a 
fact of international relations, it is law-breaking and not anarchy, a key distinction.  In this 
respect, international society is no different from domestic society, in which law-breaking 
                                                                                                                                                       
would ever stick for very long.” STANLEY HOFFMAN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS 4 (1978).  Thomas Nagel carries 
this objection forward and restates it in a more sophisticated contemporary form in his Storrs Lectures, published as 
“The Problem of Global Justice.” Thomas Nagel supra note 13. 
74 Id. at 88 
75 Id. at 96. 
76 Id. at 90. 
77 Beitz identifies four key features of the state of nature that would have to obtain in international relations if 
Hobbes were to be descriptively correct, and finds that none of the four in fact hold.  Those features are: (1) that 
states are the only actors in international relations; (2) that they have relatively equal power; (3) they are 
independent in the sense that they can order their internal affairs independently of each others’ policies; and (4) 
there are no reliable expectations of reciprocal compliance with the rules of cooperation. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY, 
at 36.  Beitz argues that in important respects the contemporary international system does not resemble this portrait. 
See id. at 36-48. 
78 See e.g. ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
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continues to occur within what we would still acknowledge to be a domestic social order capable 
of justice.  Given its empirical inaccuracy, the moral conclusions of a Hobbesian worldview are 
equally unsupportable.79 
  4. Applying Political Theory to International Economic Law 
 In the preceding section we have sought to demonstrate how standard objections to 
transboundary normative obligations are not fatal to the relationship between trade and justice – 
far from it.  One is free, therefore, to build upon one’s general account of the relationship 
between political theory and trade law, and proceed to adapt one’s specific theory to the social, 
political and economic context of international economic law and its rules, institutions and 
systems.  Here one encounters the difference between abstract theory, often developed in a 
domestic social context, and the stubborn complex realities of transboundary social and 
economic relations and international politics.  
a. Engaging Core Theoretical Elements with Core Institutional Realities 
 One of the most critical elements in a normative critique of trade law is to carefully 
articulate the specific nexus between institutional activity on the ground and the principles of the 
theory: how does the specific international, economic and legal character of the situation 
influence the suitability and application of the theory? Each political theory will have specific 
core assumptions and principles unique to that theory, which must be specifically engaged with 
                                               
79 I should qualify this to say, unsupportable at least in their strong Hobbesian form.  Nagel presents a compelling 
account of the necessity for more effective transboundary political institutions, even at some cost to legitimacy, 
before we can meaningfully begin to talk about global justice, characterizing this view as Hobbesian in spirit if not 
in letter.  Nagel, supra note 13, at 147. Even Nagel, however, concludes that we are on a positive path towards 
global justice, albeit on a perhaps more circuitous and less satisfying route than cosmopolitans would desire.  Id.   
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the socioeconomic context of trade if the theoretical critique is to be trenchant, and not merely 
superficial.80   
As an illustration, we offer the following example, drawn from work on Rawls and trade 
law.81 The key normative assumption underlying a Rawlsian account of trade and justice is that 
differences in natural endowments, and any differences in the allocation of social goods 
stemming from these natural inequalities, are unmerited or morally arbitrary.82  The task of 
international justice is to furnish principles that will serve both as a standard for evaluating the 
social response to natural inequalities, and as a guide to social institutions for making distributive 
allocations that will justify social inequalities.  The key to making this translation between 
Rawlsian justice and trade law lies in understanding the normative significance of markets, not 
as social mechanisms for resource allocation but as markers for the cumulative effects of natural 
and social inequalities.  In other words, the relative size and strength of markets can indicate to 
us how many of the natural and social inequalities among states have translated into the relative 
strength of consumer markets and producer groups.  
The primary doctrinal tools within trade law for addressing inequality problems are 
collectively referred to as ‘special and differential treatment,’ and consist of three main elements: 
market access, market protection and technical assistance.83  In key ways, each of these tools 
shifts the relationship between developing country markets and developed country markets in 
ways significant to both trade patterns and the Rawlsian theory of justice.  Applying Rawls’ 
difference principle to trade law with an understanding of the role of the market as a 
                                               
80 For a fuller discussion of the methodological issues attendant to justice theorizing concerning international 
economic law, see generally Carmody, Garcia and Linarelli, “Conclusion,” in Global Justice, supra note --. 
81GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE 82. 
82 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 62-64. 
83 GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE 31-38. 
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manifestation of economic inequalities, suggests that in a liberal theory of just trade, market 
access would need to be established on terms that benefit the least advantaged. Since preferential 
market access is managed through special and differential treatment rules, this imperative can 
also be understood as a normative criterion placed upon special and differential treatment law as 
a condition of the difference principle.  Thus the basis for a Rawlsian critique of special and 
differential treatment – and trade law in general – is established. 
C     Internal Approaches to the Justice of International Economic Law 
Taken together, external theorists operate through essentially the same basic structure: 
develop a broad, strong principle of justice within a given framework and then address the issues 
arising from its implementation through international law and institutions. External theorists 
superimpose principles of justice such as human rights or distributive principles on the present 
structure of international economic law institutions. Such principles are only loosely related to 
international economic law institutions as structured presently. The contribution of external 
theorists is to suggest mechanisms whereby the full application of these principles can be more 
gradual, nuanced and in keeping with institutional and political realities. However, the impact of 
such externally based theories of justice has been rather limited and the policy suggestions of 
such approaches have been criticized for being “at best, of second order concern and, at worst, 
counterproductive.”84 
 However, there is a way to approach the relationship between principles of justice and 
international economic law from an entirely different perspective, one that does away with the 
need for such complex attempts at mediation. To begin with, what if we looked for principles of 
                                               
84 Tesón and Klick, Global Justice at 1. 
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justice within the systems and institutions we are studying, instead of outside them?85  This is the 
premise behind Aaron James’ intriguing “structural equity” approach to global justice.  
Alternatively, we can begin with our understanding of trade as a phenomenon, which contains 
within itself intrinsic elements of great relevance to a justice inquiry. This leads to an approach 
similar to that James, but focused on a phenomenological investigation of trade rather than on the 
deduction of principles of structural equity from the legal framework of the system. This 
investigation into the nature of trade as a human experience reveals that many aspects of current 
trade law and policy mix what is ostensibly trade with something else—exploitation, coercion, or 
predation.  This has important normative and pragmatic implications for global trade policy, and 
offers us a radically different take on the possibility of and approach to global justice, as well as 
the institutions within the free trade regime. 
   1    Structural Equity 
 In “Global Economic Fairness: Internal Principles” Aaron James examines principles of 
fairness that are inherent within the global economic system by virtue of the structure of that 
system.  These principles comprise “structural equity,” the manner in which an institution 
distributes its advantages and disadvantages in order to achieve equitable results.86   
                                               
85 See, e.g., RICHARD MILLER, supra note 3 at 71 (distinguishing ‘deliberations with a goal of justice internal to the 
regime from deliberations with external goals.’). 
86 James distinguishes three principles of structural equity in trade relations. The first principle concerns the harms 
from trade, that is, certain individuals will be adversely impacted by free trade and measures should be taken by 
states to alleviate such impact.  An example of this principle is the controversial Trade Adjustment Assistance that 
was attached to the bills of the FTAs between the US and Korea, Panama and Colombia in US Congress. The 
second principle requires that the gains of trade be equally distributed within a society, or in manner acceptable to 
all members of that society. The third principle is simply the second principle brought up on a global basis so that 
trading societies share equally in the gains of trade or distribute those gains in a manner acceptable to them all. 
Aaron James, Global Economic Fairness: Internal Principles in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW supra note 5, (hereinafter James, Internal Principles). 
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Thus, instead of discussing justice in international trade from the point of view of 
external approaches (such as communitarianism or cosmopolitanism), internal approaches look 
at the system as it is already structured, and offer a prescriptive analysis rooted in the framework 
of the trade regime. Through the concept of “structural equity,” which dictates how gains and 
burdens are shared within a system87, we can try to deduce standards of justice, which can be 
applied to international economic law as a means of evaluating policies and procedures, and 
offering policy recommendations. 
The World Trade Organization can serve as an example. The aim of the WTO is clear: 
“to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading 
system.”1 The WTO agreements have established a series of rights and obligations for its 
members, and created a series of expectations in these members.   The organization seeks to 
protect these expectations through various channels exemplified by the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.  
When an authorized suspension of concessions is an effective means to bring a party into 
compliance with its WTO obligation in a case brought by a developed country, but the same rule 
is not as effective when a developing country is awarded the right to suspend concessions, we are 
faced with an unjust result.88 This is an internal issue because this failure reflects a frustration of 
member expectations through an ineffective means of dispute settlement. It is a justice issue, 
because as Chios Charmody points out, WTO “[j]ustice is… about maintaining the distribution 
of expectations [of trade related behavior] which is equal; the ethos is justice-as-equality.”89 
                                               
87 Id. 
88 See e.g. United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services 
(DE285) 
89 Chios Carmody, A Theory of WTO Law, 11 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 527, 542 (2008). 
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Thus, justice and fairness are an intrinsic part of the WTO because they are integral parts of the 
system itself. 
  The existence of internal principles of structural equity in a system makes it easier to 
deduce standards of justice to evaluate that system. These standards of justice are connected 
closely with standards of legitimacy. Although legitimacy can be a purely formal concept, justice 
plays a significant role in determining if an institution is legitimate because, after all, principles 
of structural equity require some degree of internal consistency within an institution.  
From the example above we can derive that equality between members is such a standard 
in the WTO.  However, although equality is a broad concept, it is not the case that it is an 
intrinsic part of all international organizations, as for example in organizations such as the IMF 
in which certain members have de jure veto power.  Further, different organizations and different 
regimes would have different standards derived from internal principles.  Within the World Bank 
and the IMF, for example, access to funds is not formally equal: progressivity in the form of 
preferential and concessional lending to the least developed borrowers is an important internal 
operating principle, thereby making inequality an internal principle of justice in the service of 
fairness within such organizations.90  
   2    Consent 
 In the case of trade we can go even further in our understanding of the internal principles 
controlling the regime. Complementing James’ structural equity approach is another internal 
                                               
90 See Garcia, Bretton Woods (evaluating, but from an external viewpoint, the unequal access to development capital 
and trade currencies as an important element of justice); on lending conditionality in general, see Arner supra note 
15. 
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account of the morality of trade, focusing on “consent.”91  Consent is an intrinsic element of 
trade; it is what makes trade “trade” and not something else. This concept is important in the 
present discussion because it frames our understanding of trade in terms of James’ “structural 
equity.”92  It not only supports a theory of justice in trade relations, it requires it.  
By consent here we do not mean the concept of state consent in international relations 
theory.93 In international law, consent is a formal principle of legitimacy. As such, this notion of 
consent is important to the extent trade law is part of international law, and trade agreements are 
instruments under international law.  In the present discussion, however, we seek through 
“consent” to grasp an elusive quality in trade arising from social relationships formed through an 
exchange.  Consent is the essential characteristic which makes such an economic exchange 
“trade,” rather than theft, coercion, exploitation, or the like, and thus helps us distinguish 
between what appears to be trade from what is trade in the real meaning of the word.  When an 
act passes as trade but upon closer examination is not trade because it does not reflect consent, 
this act generates costs that impede the flourishing of trade, and thus undermine the subject of 
trade. 
The concept of consent as an internal principle of trade is revealed through examination 
of aspects of our language, concepts, and cultural experiences of trade as a human phenomenon. 
Trade is a fundamental part of human experience. It encapsulates our relation to the world, our 
encounter with the world and our domination of the world. Trade is fundamentally an exchange 
of goods and services, an exchange of economic value. Through this exchange we come into 
                                               
91 See Frank J. Garcia, Three Takes on Global Justice, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 323 (2010); Frank J. Garcia, Is Free 
Trade “Free”? Is it even trade? Oppression and Consent in Hemispheric Trade Agreements, 5 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. 
JUST. 505 (2007).  
92 See James, Internal Principles. 
93For an overview of consent in international relations and the role of consent as a legitimizing factor in international 
law see Matthew Lister, The Legitimating Role of Consent in International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 663-91 (2011). 
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contact with different people and lands, cultures and ideas.  We discover and create our own 
identity as we come into contact with others through trade. In this way, trade is a primal form of 
communication, expressing who we are, what we make, what we want and how we exchange.  
Trade is fundamentally a voluntary, bilateral exchange of economic value. Individuals 
and peoples enter into trade relationships with the same fundamental motivation: to improve 
their condition. Thus in general people will enter into trade relations that they consider fair if 
they are free to make and choose their own bargains, and this shapes the nature of the trade 
regime in the long run.  
However, not everything called ‘trade’ is really trade – economic exchanges have also 
been used to dominate and conquer. 94 There are many types of transactions that involve transfer 
of value, but they are not trade because the absence of consent undermines the requisite 
voluntary element of a trade relationship. In circumstances where, in the words of Simone 
Weil,95 one seeks consent where there is no power of refusal, the result is not trade, but 
predation. In such cases, an economic benefit flows from one party to the other, but it is not 
mutual in any meaningful way.  
The same can be said in cases of coercion, where there is some consent on the surface but 
the artificial restriction on the range of possible bargains makes consent a pure formality. 
Further, exchanges that do not involve roughly equal value cannot be considered trade but are a 
                                               
94 For example, trading companies asserted sovereignty and extended the colonizing states’ dominion over vast 
territories the European states were not ready to administer directly. See ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, 
SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (2005).  
95SIMONE WEIL, Justice and Human Society, in SIMONE WEIL 116, 123 (Eric O. Springsted ed., 1998) 
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form of exploitation when a potentially higher bidder has been excluded by the prevailing party, 
which is therefore exploiting the other in the resulting bargain.96 
Consent is a standard of justice. However, unlike equality, it is not derived from the 
structure of an institution but from a rather intuitive understanding of trade generally. Although 
the applicability of consent in a multilateral context such as the WTO has yet to be fully 
explored,97 it is clearly a very robust standard in evaluating justice and fairness in other aspects 
of international economic law, such as bilateral trade agreements, investor-state dispute 
resolution and the generalized system of preferences.  
3.  Working with Internal Approaches – the case of DR-CAFTA 
Applying internal approaches to actual international trade agreements illustrates the 
subtle but important forces at work in contemporary trade relations, particularly as they involve 
substantial inequalities in power among participating states.  These inequalities and their 
structural consequences undercut global justice through their effects on the rules of the game, 
making it less likely that trade law and institutions will either meet members’ legitimate 
expectations of equality, or establish rules supporting true consensual exchanges among market 
actors.  
The use of consent as an internal principle of justice in trade law suggests that in matters 
of global rulemaking, which today means principally economic rulemaking through trade 
agreements, we should actually structure such negotiations to achieve and reflect the consent of 
their participants, aiming for substantive rules which protect and support consent at the private 
                                               
96 Hillel Steiner, A Liberal Theory of Exploitation, 94 ETHICS 225 (1983-84). See also RICHARD MILLER, supra note 
3 at 60-62 (characterizing exploitation in international bargains as taking advantage of another’s difficulty to secure 
agreements not otherwise possible). 
97 But see RICHARD MILLER, supra note 3 at 69-83 (positing an account of ‘reasonable deliberations’ at the WTO 
that focuses on coercion and exploitation). 
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party level.  We do this not as a way of confining trade within a particular view, but as a way to 
promote its flourishing across the widest possible spectrum of individuals, transactions, and 
relationships. 
First, this requires that we take the role of consent in trade negotiations seriously.  If trade 
consists of voluntary, bargained-for exchanges, then the rules governing trade must preserve the 
possibility of bargained-for exchanges among private parties, and the rules themselves must be 
the fruit of such a bargain.98 If the rules of the game are not mutually agreed to, then any 
bargains struck under those rules are not fully free because they are not fully agreed to.99 
Without consent, agreements structuring economic exchange will be a form of oppression, or 
worse, predation, which cause systemic disadvantages to certain players.100  
Consent must extend to difficult questions: whether the states have anything resembling 
equal bargaining power; whether a negotiating government speaks for the full range of affected 
citizens (or whether it speaks for its people at all); and whether a government has an adequate 
alternative to a negotiated outcome.101 Otherwise, we risk mistaking formal consent in the sense 
used in international relations theory, for that consent which makes trade, trade.102  
Some examples from the recent Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), a 
2004 regional trade agreement between the U.S., five Central American states, and the 
                                               
98 Frank J. Garcia, Is Free Trade “Free”? Is It Even “Trade”? Oppression and Consent in Hemispheric Trade 
Agreements, 5 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 507, 514 (2007).   
99 Id. We do not address here the important question of whether any degree of failure of consent at level one (inter-
state negotiations) fatally vitiates the possibility of true trade at level two (private party contracts). 
100 Id. at 514–15. 
101 In negotiation theory, the latter is referred to as a party’s Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). 
If a party has no BATNA, it is in a very weak position.  BATNA “is the only standard which can protect you both 
from accepting terms that are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms it would be in your interest to accept.” 
ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 97 (1981). 
102 Similarly, Weil writes that in looking purely at the fact of voting, democratic theory mistakes true consent for a 
form of consent, which can easily, like any other form, be mere form.  WEIL, supra note 73, at 126 
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Dominican Republic, illustrate the operation of an internal critique based on consent.103 In DR-
CAFTA, we see examples of what is ostensibly free trade, but in fact a form of coercion (no free 
bargaining), exploitation (no equivalent value), or predation (no consent).  
With respect to the negotiation of the treaty, there are at least two issues: the problem of 
unequal bargaining power between states, and the question of legitimacy stemming from the 
problem of underrepresented groups. We cannot assume even in the United States, let alone most 
developing countries, that the government speaks for all affected sectors of society.  This issue is 
of special concern throughout the Central American region, where governments have a history of 
capture by elites.104 Lack of representation is particularly serious when fundamental economic 
decisions are being made, as in the CAFTA negotiations. In Nicaragua, for example, during the 
CAFTA negotiations, there was widespread ignorance among most affected groups regarding 
what CAFTA would do, and there were allegations of a campaign of disinformation on the part 
of the government.105 Many sectors of society were concerned that the new government only 
spoke for and negotiated on behalf of the moneyed interests, despite a recent history of social 
revolution.106 For these sectors, the treaty and its resulting economic activity are neither mutual, 
nor voluntary; the parties are not trading—something is being taken from them.107 In consent 
theory terms, the treaty does not create trade between the parties. Rather it creates a form of theft 
or extraction.108 
                                               
103 See generally Garcia, supra note 75, at 515; on RTAs generally see Chin Lim, The Trade Agreements Regime: 
WTO and the RTAs (in this volume). 
104 See THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 46 (2nd ed. 1989) (discussing exercise 
of political power by or for elites endemic to region 
105 Id. at 516 
106 Id. at 516 
107 Garcia, supra note 75, at 516. 
108 Id. 
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Even if CAFTA is both mutual and voluntary, we must still consider whether it represents 
the full consent of the parties.109 During the CAFTA negotiations, for example, it was often 
mentioned by the Nicaraguan government that the country did not have a real alternative to the 
treaty, due to the U.S. playing such a dominant role in the Nicaraguan economy as the principal 
source of capital and markets.110 Moreover, given the history of external domination of the 
southern hemisphere, both colonially and post-colonially, we must consider the possibility that 
other states in the region and elsewhere—states that might have offered more attractive 
alternative markets and sources of capital than the U.S.—may not have been able to do so.111 The 
United States, for example, exercised its role as the regional hegemon during the last century by 
restricting regional and other states’ opportunities in the hemisphere, which has continuing 
economic effects today.112  
Consent problems are not confined to the negotiation stage – they affect the substance of 
the treaty as well, ensuring that provisions arrived at nonconsensually through severely unequal 
bargaining will affect economic relations among market actors for the duration of the treaty.  For 
example, the terms and timing of market access speak volumes about a weaker party’s capacity 
to protect its markets from external competition before local industry is ready.  Moreover, when 
we look at which sectors are excluded by whom and why, we get a more complete picture of the 
weaker party’s ability, or lack thereof, to bargain for what it wanted and needed. 
To take the agriculture sector as an example, CAFTA eliminates the protections in place 
for regional small-scale farmers and agricultural workers in several key sectors such as rice and 
                                               
109 Id. at 517. 
110 Id. at 517. 
111 Id. at 517. 
112 SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 81, at 5-7 (asserting that historic external domination has both threatened 
sovereignty and restricted available policy choices). On the problem of elites appropriating wealth see also Leif 
Weinar, Property Rights and the Resource Curse, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 36 (2008). 
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yellow corn,113 exposing them to immediate competition from highly subsidized U.S. agricultural 
products.114 However, the United States assiduously maintained protection of sugar,115 one of its 
most sensitive sectors that had been of interest to Central American exporters.116 Moreover, in 
many of the sectors where CAFTA governments announced victories, their exports had either 
already enjoyed privileged access under the U.S. trade preference programs, or are effectively 
blocked by sanitary or phytosanitary measures.117 
Such one-sided bargains offer evidence of the disparity in bargaining power that plagues 
the treaty.118 In order to understand the consent by Central American governments to such one-
sided provisions, it may be helpful to employ the concepts of coercion and exploitation 
developed here.  That such one-sided market access provisions were agreed to by Central 
American governments may suggest a coercive aspect to the negotiation, in which the United 
States relied on the Central American inequality in power to keep certain options (such as 
liberalization of the sugar market) off the table while pressing ahead for the concessions it 
wanted.119 Alternatively, or in tandem, Central American consent can be evidence of 
                                               
113 Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, Annex 3.3., Tariff Schedule of the 
United States Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-
DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html [hereinafter CAFTA]. 
114 Carlos Galian, CAFTA: The Nail in the Coffin of Central American Agriculture, in WHY WE SAY NO TO CAFTA 
4 (Alliance for Resp. Trade 2004). 
115 CAFTA, supra note 91, at 5; Annex 3.3, Tariff Schedule of the United States. 
116 See Galian, supra note 92; see also Elizabeth Becker, Costa Rica to Be 5th Country In New Trade Pact With 
U.S.,  N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004, at A6 (reporting that the United States won its demand for opening Central 
American agriculture market to its exports while maintaining protection for sugar industry, of interest to the region). 
117 Galian, supra note 92, at 6. 
118 Editorial, Harvesting Poverty: A New Trade Deal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 2003, at A30 (asserting CAFTA’s terms 
reflect asymmetry in negotiating power between the United States and the Central American region).  Such 
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Julio J. Nogu s , The Unbalanced Uruguay Round Outcome: The New Areas in Future WTO Negotiations 3-4 (World 
Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 2732, 2001). 
119 See James C. McKinley Jr., U.S. Trade Pact Divides the Central Americans, With Farmers and Others Fearful, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, sec. 1, at 18 (reporting Central American negotiators lacked sufficient leverage to 
extract needed concessions from the United States, and faced implicit threat of loss of trade preferences).  We will 
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exploitation, insofar as the United States relied on the absence of other states able to offer 
Central America more attractive terms in the “auction.”  In either case, the one-sided nature of 
the market access provisions in agriculture suggests that the treaty may not truly reflect free 
trade,,and is unfair in a manner quite relevant to the larger question of trade and justice.  
 4 Methodological Reflections on the Internal Approach 
 As with the external approach, there are important methodological considerations when 
carrying out an internal normative analysis of trade law.  However, as the internal approach is 
relatively more recent, the issue of methodology is less well understood.  Nevertheless, drawing 
on the methodological issues in the more mature external approach, we can suggest some 
relevant considerations. 
First, it is important to carefully identify the key internal features of the socio-legal 
system in question, and justify one’s selection.  For example, why does James focus on the legal-
theoretical framework of the trading system when seeking to identify trade’s internal principles 
of fairness?  Why does Carmody focus on justice-as-equality for WTO Members in his theory of 
WTO law? Why is consent, among other core constitutive elements of trade as an experience, 
foregrounded in the consent approach to fair trade?   One might call this the moral inductive 
move in developing an internal theory of fair trade.  Paying careful attention to such questions is 
key to establishing a sound basis for the analysis and prescription to follow.   
     Second, and related, is a concern to carefully articulate the normative significance of 
these features.  In other words, the persuasiveness and impact of an internal approach depends 
upon the clarity and cogency of the principles one draws from the system or underlying concept 
                                                                                                                                                       
not know the full details of the negotiations for some time, as all members of the CAFTA negotiations signed 
confidentiality agreements.  See CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES, Transparency and Participation in the Negotiations, 
in FAIR TRADE OR FREE TRADE? UNDERSTANDING CAFTA, available at 
http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/mtoups/cafta_ briefing_final_dec03.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2007) 
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under analysis.  One could call this the deductive move in the internal approach, as one seeks to 
deduce from the socio-legal features one has identified, their normative implications. 
     Finally, it is important to sustain the analysis all the way through to the norms, 
institutions and dynamics of the legal system under review.  A unique characteristic of internal 
approaches is that there is a strong interdisciplinary aspect to them. By looking at the legal 
theoretical framework of institutions of international trade, or trade itself as human experience, 
we take, and are obligated to take, into account discussions that traditionally would fall within 
the domain of political science, economics etc. In fact, the internal approach to trade is an 
attempt to bridge the gap between these disciplines and to overcome the disconnect between 
global justice theorists and the realities of the international trade regime.120  Here the same issues 
of application and context raised above with respect to the external approach, apply equally to 
the internal approach.  Ultimately, the value of any internal approach must be judged by the same 
standard: how effectively does it identify serious injustices in contemporary international 
economic law, and how effectively does it suggest how international economic law should be re-
negotiated, reformed, etc. 
Looking ahead, we can expect as the internal approach develops and matures, there will 
be other methodological issues to consider and new internal approaches with which to enrich our 
arsenal of justice tools.  One interesting area for future work involves undertaking a more 
explicitly phenomenological approach to trade law.121  Another important area is to develop a 
more explicitly cross-cultural or anthropological study of trade as a human experience, testing 
intuitions developed from a Western view across the range of human experience.  
                                               
120 See e.g., Tesón and Klick, Global Justice. 
121 See e.g., Teresa Goodwin Phelps & Jenny Ann Pitts, Questioning the Text: The Significance of 
Phenomenological Hermenutics for Legal Interpretation, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 353 (1985).  
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III    Theories of Justice and the Trade Linkage or ‘Trade and…’ Phenomenon 
The on-going trade linkage or “trade and ___” debate confronts us with the relationship 
between the rules and structures of trade law, and many serious contemporary problems 
involving gross economic inequalities, conflicting concepts of human dignity and environmental 
protection, and other heavily value-laden issues such as “culture” and “property.”  In discussing 
linkages such as “trade and development,” “trade and labor,” “trade and the environment,” and 
“trade and human rights,” we are delving more deeply and perhaps even more problematically 
into the nature of the relationship between trade and justice.122 
A Justice and the “Trade and ___” Debate 
Each “trade and      ” debate fundamentally involves a series of questions about justice.123 
They are questions of justice because they involve decisions as to the allocation of social goods 
and social burdens across national boundaries; they highlight the effects of our actions on the 
well-being and property of others across national boundaries; and resolving them will involve 
evaluating the propriety of certain gains and the correction of improper gain across national 
boundaries.124 
                                               
122 On the linkage between international economic law and human rights see e.g. DAVID KINLEY, CIVILISING 
GLOBALISATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2009); on the relationship between trade and labor 
see e.g. Brian Greenhill, Layna Mosley & Aseem Prakash, Trade-based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, 
1986-2002, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 669-690 (2009); for an overview of the trade-environment linkage see e.g., 
Jagdish Bhagwati, Thinking Clearly About the Linkage Between Trade and the Environment, in TERRACOTTA 
READER: A MARKET APPROACH TO THE ENVIRONMENT  
(Parth J. Shah & Vidisha Maitra eds., 2005), 425-436. 
123 This discussion updates and further develops an earlier treatment of this issue by one of the authors.  See Frank J. 
Garcia, Linking the Trade Linkage Debates, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L 391 (1998).  
124 Dunoff writes that ‘trade and’ issues such as intellectual property highlight that interstate distributional questions 
are at the heart of international trade policy, challenging the common view that cooperation or collaboration, rather 
than distribution, is the key issue.  See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, in Symposium, Linkage as 
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The relationship between poverty, inequality, development and trade is a paradigmatic 
example of the link between trade and justice.  The distribution of social goods has always been 
a central concern in justice theory.  The connection between the global economic system (of 
which trade and trade law are foundational elements) and the uneven allocation of wealth among 
states and among individuals is widely recognized, even if its precise nature is hotly contested.125  
Given this relationship, what obligations do we owe to developing states in structuring our trade 
relationships?  To poor individuals in developing states? To the poor, as a group, in every state?  
Whatever one’s view as to the appropriate answer to these questions—utilitarian, 
egalitarian liberal, libertarian, communitarian, etc.-- simply understanding that the trade-
development link is a justice issue involving the problem of inequality, implies that we are not 
free to govern our economic relationships with poorer people and states solely according to 
instrumental politics.  Those seeking to establish a global economic order that does not consider 
the claims of less developed states and the poor must articulate a normative basis for this 
position.  In other words, they must explain why such an order would be just, and why territorial 
political boundaries require or justify such an order.126 
The trade and environment linkage has been at the forefront of the linkage movement,127 
and raises its own variations of the basic justice questions. One set of issues concerns how best to 
                                                                                                                                                       
Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 19. U. PA. J. INT’L L. 201 (1998); infra notes 130-31 and 
accompanying text. 
125 See supra note 4 and sources cited therein.  
126 For an unequivocal statement of this challenge, see Pogge, Priorities of Global Justice, supra note 8. 
127 The trade and environment linkage has been actively in the public eye since the early 1990s.  See Thomas J. 
Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 
AM. J. INT’L L. 268, 268 (1997); Daniel Esty’s Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment and the Future, 27 
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 459 (1994).  The 1990’s also saw a series of GATT panel reports destined to have a significant 
impact on the trade and environment debate.  See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS20/R (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839; GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report 
on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991 GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993), reprinted in 30 
I.L.M. 1594 (the Tuna/Dolphin decisions).  With the Shrimp-Turtle decision, the GATT/WTO has come full circle. 
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balance one’s ethical and legal obligations to the environment with competing economic interests 
and one’s obligations under trade law.128 Similarly, since environmental protection in one 
jurisdiction can manifest itself as merely an externality in another, we must always concern 
ourselves with how both environmental law and trade law allocate the burdens of environmental 
protection and environmental harm among states and among different groups within states.129 All 
of these issues inevitably involve us in fundamental conversations about justice and the 
distribution of benefits and burdens.   
The trade and human rights debate also raises difficult justice problems.  The relationship 
between human rights and international economic law has become a central preoccupation of 
contemporary legal scholarship, rivaling the “trade and environment’ literature both in its 
saliency and in its constitutive quality for both fields.130 The trade and human rights linkage also 
rivals the trade and inequality linkage in the extent to which its questions are explicitly justice 
questions, insofar as they involve the allocation and protection of core legal rights, which in our 
tradition are perhaps the most highly valued of all social goods.   
                                                                                                                                                       
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products adopted 12 October 1998, DS58/AB/R. 
See e.g. Scott Barrett, Climate Change and International Trade: Lessons on their Linkage from International 
Environmental Agreements, Thinking Ahead on International Trade (TAIT) – 2nd Conference Climate Change, 
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These issues are difficult in part because they arise in a context of conflict over 
fundamental values.  A key aspect of Western conceptions of justice is respect for fundamental 
human rights.  This commitment is the basis for the tremendous post-war development of human 
rights protection within public international law.  But not all trading states share the same 
conception of human rights, whether within the Western tradition or outside of it, and not all 
trading states share the same view of how differences in human rights and the values they reflect 
should be ignored, accommodated or challenged in international economic relations.131  These 
conflicting views surface as debates over the place of human rights within international 
economic law;132 the compatibility or incompatibility with human rights of both specific trade 
rules and agreements, and the WTO system as a whole;133 and over the most effective and 
appropriate responses within international economic law to human rights violations.134 
B Justice and the Resolution of Trade Linkage Issues 
Recognizing the link between trade linkage issues and justice can help us resolve these 
issues in a more principled manner.  We can evaluate techniques and options for resolving 
                                               
131 See e.g., Sarah Joseph, supra note 129 at 32-46. 
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3; see also Garcia and Jun, Trade Based Strategies for Combating Child Labor, in WESTON, ED., CHILD LABOR AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING CHILDREN MATTER (2005).   
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linkage conflicts in an analytic framework that draws out their underlying normative 
commitments and implications.  Theories of justice thus serve both to put the quest for efficiency 
– so central to contemporary trade discourse and so often at stake in the linkage debates – within 
a larger normative context, and to supplement this line of inquiry with a more comprehensive 
framework for policy formulation.   Working out these linkage issues is a key stage in 
elaborating a coherent and just set of global economic and social policies. 
One practical implication of a justice analysis of trade linkage is that certain existing 
policies or practices now considered to be discretionary on the part of the implementing state 
may come to be seen as in fact obligatory, on the basis of that state’s moral obligations to its 
trading partners.  For example, in the trade and development area the principle of asymmetry or 
preferential treatment for developing countries is a key technique for managing inequality 
problems.135 However, much of the trade between developed and developing countries is 
conducted under some form of discretionary unilateral trade preference program136 which 
effectively structures preferences in favor of the granting state, rather than the recipient state.137 
One can argue from a variety of normative perspectives ranging from Rawls to feminist legal 
theory, that asymmetric trade relations are a normative obligation and not a political option on 
the part of wealthy states.138 If so, then justice may require that such discretionary unilateral 
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TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE 128.  The ethic of care articulated by feminist philosophers, as applied to 
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preference programs be re-cast in favor of the recipients, and supplemented by non-discretionary 
trade-related development aid and other ways of addressing inequality in trade relationships.139 
A second, related effect of a justice analysis is that certain existing linkage tools now 
considered legitimate, even attractive, might in fact be seen as unattractive or even unjust if 
normatively reevaluated.  For example, one popular linkage tool in both the human rights and 
environment debates is the practice of trade conditionality, which in this context means linking 
trade preferences and other advantageous trade treatment with adherence to certain values as 
reflected in appropriate treaties involving the environment, human rights, etc.140 In normative 
terms, this approach depends upon the view that liberalized trade is a policy tool that can be 
granted or withheld for instrumental reasons.  However, if one comes to understand preferential 
trade, and free trade in general, as expressing a normative commitment under theories of justice, 
one is no longer free to condition such treatment for instrumental reasons on compliance with 
other extrinsic legal or political conditions. 
                                                                                                                                                       
international relations, might require a similar result.  See Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to 
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L613, 615 (1991); Hilary Charlesworth, The Woman Question in International 
Law, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 1(2010); Dianne Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in 
International Law Over the Last Decade, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L 11 (2009). 
139 GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE; but see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Dysfunction and Diversion and the Debate 
over Preferences: (How) Do Preferential Trade Policies Work?, in  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL 
SYSTEM (Chantal Thomas and  Joel P. Trachtman, eds., 2009).  On the general relationship between the WTO and 
development, see S. ROLLAND, WTO AND DEVELOPMENT (2011). 
140 One example of this practice is the requirement that EU member and associated states be parties to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom.  Therefore, if a state is to participate in 
European integration, it must recognize certain human rights norms.  See LORAND BARTELS, HUMAN RIGHTS 
CONDITIONALITY IN THE EU'S INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (2005);  see generally Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, 
Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression, 59 I.O. 593 (2005) 
(arguing for the effectiveness of this approach); James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary Linkage, 
27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 793, 808-09 (1994) (lamenting the failure to adopt conditionality in NAFTA as a lost 
opportunity); Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization and Social Issues, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 17, 22 (1994) 
(citing conditionality practices with approval).  A related issue involves unilateral state efforts to condition trade 
benefits on human rights protection and other social goals, which must survive WTO review (hence implicating the 
WTO in state-level conditionality practices through its response).  See KRISTA NADAKAVUKAREN SCHEFER, SOCIAL 
REGULATION IN THE WTO: TRADE POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENT (2010). 
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 The trade and environment link in particular highlights a third area in which a justice 
perspective may have practical implications for trade law, namely the issue of determining the 
proper forum and decisional criteria for the institutional resolution of trade linkage conflicts.141 
Institutional dispute settlement bodies confronted with linkage issues must be capable of making 
decisions that address the wide range of social values at stake, in a manner consistent with our 
commitments to procedural as well as substantive justice.142 Once such institutions are identified 
or established, a justice perspective requires careful analysis of the principles and criteria 
employed in decisions involving linkage issues.143 Normative preferences which may well 
predetermine the outcome of linkage decisions are likely to be embedded in such criteria.144 
When viewed in this light the WTO, as the principal trade-based forum for handling linkage 
                                               
141Environmentalists  criticized the GATT decision-making process in the first Tuna-Dolphin case, United States—
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Trachtman, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND THE RIGHT TO REGULATE 57 (2005).  The risks for institutions 
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Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 658, 702-07 (1996).    In this respect, one key aspect already prominent in 
trade policy debates – and clearly foregrounded by linkage issues – is participation by interest groups in WTO 
dispute resolution, an issue with overtones of democratic theory. See Robert F. Housman, Democratizing 
International Trade Decision-Making, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 699 (1994). 
143 See generally Joel P. Trachtman, “Trade and . . .” Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 32 (1997). 
144 See Nichols, supra note 128, at 700-01 (reviewing factors in GATT dispute settlement panel doctrine giving 
primacy to trade in conflicts with other values).  For example, it has been argued that in the analysis of GATT 
dispute settlement involving trade-environment issues, certain criteria such as “proof of endangerment” mask 
utilitarian assumptions tending to favor pro-trade outcomes to such disputes.  “Endangerment” implies that there is 
no harm short of dire peril that could justify interference with economically lucrative activity, ignoring the 
possibility that any harm, for example, justifies such interference.  See Housman, supra note 131, at 1376-77 
(challenging Stewart); see also Sonia Rolland, The Precautionary Principle: Development of an international 
Standard, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 429 (2002). 
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issues, still leaves much to be desired despite its clearly more socially progressive jurisprudence 
when compared to the earlier GATT.145 
 
IV    Conclusion 
Many critical accounts of the fairness of international economic law point in the end to 
some kind of transnational wealth redistribution, often considered the “third rail” of the global 
justice debate.  Although we are accustomed to wealth redistribution in a domestic context, 
shifting the argument to a transnational one raises many complex issues.  For example, there is a 
legitimacy problem: given the current state of transnational institutions, could transnational 
wealth redistribution ever be legitimate?  Similarly, there is an effectiveness problem: could 
transnational wealth redistribution ever really work without unsustainably large and powerful 
global institutions?146 
To some extent, these problems are artifacts of an external approach to global justice, in 
which mandates are imposed (or allegedly imposed) upon trade from a normative perspective 
extrinsic to the framework of these agreements.  However, it is important to point out that such 
an external approach is entirely consistent with how we critique any other form of law.  
Moreover, it is important to remember (and here a justice perspective is clarifying) that wealth 
redistribution is already under way through existing international economic law institutions, 
since they play an inescapably allocative role with respect to the rights, privileges, opportunities 
                                               
145 For a general overview of developing countries and WTO dispute resolution see, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE 
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146 The issues of legitimacy and effectiveness are of course intertwined given the nature of institutions.  See Hector 
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and burdens created by the laws they administer and the productive social relations they 
structure.  In this sense, all that a justice perspective does is make explicit what is implicit in 
existing rules and institutions, and ask us if we are satisfied with what we see.   
Nevertheless, the promise of internal approaches to trade and justice is that they do not 
suffer from this criticism – instead, they take the system as it functions and seek to clarify and 
deepen the principles inherent in its structure.  In this sense, internal approaches to the problem 
of trade and justice have developed an important new approach complementing the significant 
work already underway in external approaches.  However, there is much important work to be 
done in both external and internal approaches if international economic law is to fulfill its role 
within the larger quest for global justice.147   
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